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 On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 
9066, authorizing the mass incarceration of some 110,000 Japanese Americans and aliens 
from the West Coast, southern Arizona, and Hawaii. About two-thirds of those interned 
were American citizens; most of the others were longtime residents of the United States 
prohibited from becoming naturalized because of their “race.” Mainstream interpretations 
assert that the internment was a hasty decision made in the racist hysteria that erupted 
after Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. This perception maintains that 
the public’s long-held animosity toward Japanese in America, exacerbated by war 
hysteria, influenced West Coast pressure groups, media, and military and political leaders 
to implore federal officials in Washington for the mass incarceration, and the federal 
government eventually succumbed.  
 This paper addresses questions, raised by primary research, that challenge this 
interpretation. If the impetus for the internment came from West Coast grassroots after 
Pearl Harbor, then why had federal officials considered this option long before December 
7, 1941? If the impetus stemmed from a regional effort to rid the West Coast of people of 
Japanese descent, why did the federal government effect the internment of Japanese not 
only on the West Coast, but from throughout the Western Hemisphere?  
  Based on a broader study of internment policies and practices across time and 
space, this paper argues for a revision of the mainstream interpretation of the internment 
policy. This study demonstrates that wartime, mass internment of civilians was not 
limited to Japanese Americans and aliens, to the United States, or to World War II. 
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 On February 19, 1942─another “date which will live in infamy”─President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the forced evacuation 
and incarceration of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans and aliens from the West 
Coast, southern Arizona, and Hawaii. About two-thirds of those interned were American 
citizens; most of the others were longtime residents of the United States prohibited from 
becoming naturalized citizens because of their “race.” Though scholars have debated the 
causes of the policy, the perception that the internment was a hasty decision made in the 
racist furor following Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor prevails. This 
interpretation maintains that the public’s longstanding animosity toward Japanese in 
America, exacerbated by war hysteria, influenced West Coast political and military 
leaders to press their superiors in Washington for mass incarceration, and the federal 
government eventually succumbed.  
 This article challenges this interpretation. If the impetus for the internment came 
from the West Coast grassroots after Pearl Harbor, why had federal officials considered 
this option long before December 7, 1941? If the impetus was a bottom-up effort to rid 
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the West Coast of people of Japanese descent, why did the federal government effect the 








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 Political scientist Morton Grodzins first proposed the interpretation that the 
internment policy originated on the West Coast in the wake of Pearl Harbor. Grodzins’s 
Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (1949) placed primary 
responsibility for the internment on West Coast newspapers, pressure groups, 
Congressional delegations and other local political leaders. Driven by racism, war 
hysteria, and economic jealousy, these entities lobbied the national government for a 
military evacuation. Western Defense Commander John L. De Witt, headquartered at 
San Francisco’s Presidio, requested that the War Department order a mass evacuation on 
February 11, 1942, after the mayor of Los Angeles visited him in a “high point . . .  of 
personal pressure on the commanding general.” The War Department presented the 
recommendation to President Roosevelt, who signed Executive Order 9066 without 
review or consideration. Grodzins’s work criticized military authorities for capitulating 
to regional, civilian pressure that had more to do with domestic considerations than with 
the war effort.1 
 Concurring with Grodzins’s view that the World War II internment was 
“extraordinary” and “without precedent” in United States history, Jacobus tenBroek, 
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Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson wrote in Prejudice, War, and the 
Constitution (1954) that the policy represented “a radical departure from American 
ideals and principles.” These authors agreed that Pearl Harbor set off “unprecedented 
racism” on the West Coast, which led to the internment policy, though they emphasized 
the racism of De Witt and his staff as pivotal.2 However, in Guarding the United States 
and Its Outposts (1964), Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild 
reassessed De Witt’s role. These Army historians argued that General De Witt’s position 
on the necessity of Japanese American internment vacillated under pressure from the 
War Department as well as West Coast influences.3   
 Roger Daniels synthesized these interpretations in Concentration Camps U.S.A.: 
Japanese Americans and World War II (1971), blaming racism, war hysteria, economic 
and political interests, and De Witt for the internment policy. He argued that after Pearl 
Harbor, De Witt’s “panic-ridden, amateurish Western Defense Command began to 
pressure Washington for more drastic action against the presumably dangerous enemies 
in their midst.” This pressure, according to Daniels, supported by West Coast public, 
press, and politicians, compelled federal officials to comply with the mass evacuation 
and internment of Japanese Americans.4  
 With their focus on the West Coast, these interpretations assume that the impetus 
for internment was regional, timed to the Pearl Harbor attack, and limited to Japanese 
Americans and aliens in the United States. These assumptions contribute to the general 
perception that the internment, as Walter LaFeber summarized it in The Clash, “resulted 
from a combination of fear, racism, intense political pressures, and judgments by usually 
balanced officials who became unbalanced during the 1942 crises.”5  
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 In 1976, Michi Weglyn’s Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s 
Concentration Camps offered evidence inconsistent with the standard interpretation. 
Years of Infamy contended that federal officials suggested internment of Japanese aliens 
as early as August 1941. After Pearl Harbor and under State Department pressure, 
authorities throughout Latin America also arrested civilians of Japanese ancestry, both 
aliens and citizens, and deported them to the United States for internment. Weglyn based 
her findings on documents declassified after publication of the work of other internment 
historians. Though some scholars acknowledged Weglyn’s work and her findings were 
well-documented, her book did not revise the standard interpretation.6  
 Four years after Years of Infamy’s appearance, Daniels published Concentration 
Camps, North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada. The new edition 
included a chapter on Canada’s internment of Japanese Canadians, but Daniels did not 
revise his interpretation of the internment policy. In an article published the same year, 
he wrote that although some evidence of international pre-planning for the internment 
had been uncovered, he did not believe such material necessitated “a major revision of 
anything now in print.” He did, however, acknowledge that “given the swollen nature of 
modern bureaucracies, one can never be sure that one has seen all the relevant surviving 
papers, and additional such material may be unearthed.” 7 
 Like Weglyn, Gary Y. Okihiro extended his research beyond the continental 
United States, though he focused on Japanese residents of Hawaii, both alien and citizen. 
In Cane Fires: the Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945 (1991), Okihiro 
theorized that the origins of the Japanese American internment policy could be found in 
pre-World War II Hawaii. He demonstrated that after Japanese immigrant laborers 
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orchestrated a 1920 plantation strike that burned thousands of acres of sugar cane, U.S. 
military intelligence framed Japanese aliens as agents in complex sabotage and espionage 
operations, supporting a Japan-led conquest of America. In 1923, John L. De Witt, then a 
colonel in the Army’s War Plans Division, formulated a containment strategy that 
authorized martial law, alien registration, and selective internment of those deemed to be 
risks to “national security.” Okihiro argued that military intelligence developed these 
plans over the next twenty years, adding Japanese Americans to internment lists by 1933, 
forming the basis for the internment policy put into place after Pearl Harbor.8 
 Building on Okihiro’s and Weglyn’s work, this article expands the chronological 
and geographical scope of inquiry, adding further insight into the roots of the internment 
policy. A broader, more comprehensive look at primary sources across time and space 
provides a more detailed and contextualized understanding of the policy and suggests “a 








DEVELOPING INTERNMENT POLICY THROUGH WORLD WAR I 
 
 World War II was not the first time that anti-Japanese war hysteria had gripped 
the United States.  A similar uproar erupted after 1905, when Japan won control over the 
Korean peninsula and parts of southern Manchuria by defeating Russia in war. This first 
modern triumph of an Asian power over a Western one strengthened Japanese 
nationalism and resistance to Western imperialism. A Japanese-language newspaper in 
San Francisco proclaimed in 1906, for example, that Japan’s victory proved that the 
Caucasian race did not have a monopoly on power and civilization. Now, the editorial 
urged, Japanese should engage in a peaceful invasion by migrating to the United States in 
large numbers.9 
In the West, Japan’s triumph raised fears. “The situation in the far East is one 
which needs careful watching,” President Theodore Roosevelt wrote before the Russo-
Japanese War’s end. Roosevelt did not think that “the Japanese people” drew distinctions 
between Russians and Americans. “I have no doubt that they include all white men as 
being people who, as a whole, they dislike, and whose past arrogance they resent; and 
doubtless they believe their own yellow civilization to be better.”10  
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Increasing Japanese emigration to the United States and its recently annexed 
territories of Hawaii and the Philippines in the years surrounding the war aggravated 
fears of the “yellow peril.” Japanese immigration peaked between 1901 and 1908, when 
an estimated 125,000 Japanese entered the United States and its territories. Japanese 
immigration to North America reached its high point in 1907, when nearly 30,000 
Japanese arrived in the United States and more than 8,000 in Canada.11  
That same year, reflecting growing anxiety, the War Department took count of the 
Japanese population—with a separate tally of Japanese males of military age—in the 
United States, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Roosevelt negotiated the so-called 
Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan, mandating a dramatic decrease in Japanese 
immigration. He also dispatched the U.S. battle fleet from the Atlantic Coast to the Pacific 
in a show of military might. The fleet’s navigation around North and South America “is an 
indication that the Nation’s guard must extend around the continent, being especially 
needed on the Pacific Coast because of the warlike attitude of the Japanese,” lectured U.S. 
Congressman, Spanish-American War hero, and Naval Academy instructor Richmond 
Hobson on December 17, 1907, the day the fleet departed.12  
Hobson’s statement exhibited a viewpoint which later officials shared, that the 
nation’s defense perimeter against Japan must encompass the Western Hemisphere. “The 
Japanese victory over Russia,” Hobson continued, and “the whole trend of events is 
[leading] toward a contest by the yellow race, aided by the other colored races, a struggle 
to wrest from the white man his present supremacy. . . . The yellow wave that is forming 
is already moving eastward over the Pacific Ocean and lapping the shores of America, 
and America’s facing westward to check this wave is in the interest of all the white 
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nations of the earth.”13 The white hulls of the American fleet’s battleships earned the 
armada the nickname of the “Great White Fleet,” but the name had a double meaning as 
the fleet sailed toward the Pacific.  
A month after the fleet’s departure, Sam Hughes, a member of Canada’s 
Parliament, wrote to the United States War Department that “there seems no doubt but 
that the Japanese aim to make the Pacific slope of America an Oriental settlement, 
peacefully if they may, aggressively if they must.” Hughes worried about maintaining 
“the supremacy of the old Anglo Saxon race” on the North American continent. He 
warned that “the Japs” had plans and charts of the western United States and Canada 
pinpointing the location of tunnels, bridges, and other strategic points on every railway 
and road. Within a day’s notice, he claimed, resident Japanese could sabotage these 
strategic points, preventing mobilization of American troops while shiploads of armed 
Japanese from Hawaii invaded America’s shores. Hughes had served as chief of 
intelligence in the 1899-1902 British campaign against the Boers in southern Africa. 
Based on this experience, Hughes wrote that “the Boers were, as the Japs are, adept at 
cunning operations, but such are easily thwarted by energetic watchful action.”14   
 After receiving Hughes’s letter, Secretary of War William H. Taft asked Army 
Chief of Staff J. F. Bell for an opinion. Bell’s response was informed by his experience in 
fighting Plains Indians during the late nineteenth century and subjugating insurrectionists 
in the Philippines at the turn of the century. Bell helped quell the Filipino rebellion by 
moving native peoples into protected zones and camps, warning that those who remained 
outside would be given no quarter. This action mirrored the “reconcentration” policies 
that the Spanish military used in Cuba during the Ten Years’ War (1868–1878), the U.S. 
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military implemented in the American Indian wars, and the British employed against the 
Boers.15 
  “The question arises,” Bell responded to Taft on March 12, 1908, “should 
cessation of peaceful relations with Japan become imminent, whether any steps should be 
taken by our government looking toward the restraint of Japanese residing in this 
country.” Bell agreed that at the outset of war, Japanese residents might “do serious 
injury” to public utilities as Hughes warned. Though “it might be highly desirable from 
our point of view to exercise physical restraint upon Japanese in this country,” Bell 
added, any restraint of these Japanese before they had actually committed sabotage would 
provoke reprisals from Japan and prejudice the American cause with other nations. 
Experience had taught Bell a way around that obstacle. “The only solution,” he said, was 
to treat Japanese in America as if they were in danger. “The unruly elements of our own 
people might engage in unlawful acts against them. Therefore we could with entire 
propriety say to these Japanese residents, at least to those in places where there are many 
of them, that for their own safety we deem it advisable to escort them to the frontier in 
order that they may return to their own country.” Such action against Japanese residents 
“would effect the end that we desire, to protect ourselves from hostile acts of some of 
these Japanese.”16 Taft forwarded Bell’s letter to Secretary of State Elihu Root. The 
letter, marked “Action to be taken regarding Japanese residents in the U.S. in case of 
war,” remained in the “confidential” files of the State Department.17  
The opinions expressed by Bell, Hughes, Hobson, and Roosevelt reflect the tenets 
of Social Darwinism, a theory of society and race highly popular in Great Britain and the 
United States from the late nineteenth century through World War II. As scientists 
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embraced the theory of evolution explained in Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species 
(1859), intellectuals projected the principles of natural selection, or “the survival of the 
fittest,” onto sociology and politics. Seeking confirmation from the natural world for their 
prejudices, American and European expansionists manipulated science to justify their 
subjugation of “inferior” peoples. The Western attainment of world power, they reasoned, 
had proven that Caucasians were most fit for rule, alone at the top of a racial hierarchy.18 
Confident in this belief, in the 1870s and 1880s Social Darwinists in America lectured 
and published extensively not only on the Manifest Destiny of their nation, but on the 
worldwide manifest destiny of the “Anglo-Saxon race.”19  
The panic of 1893 and a prolonged economic depression shook that racial 
exuberance. A Darwinian America feared that the nation was in social decline. Looking 
for explanations, nativists claimed that an increase in immigration, particularly from 
Eastern Europe and Japan, caused the decay of “the American type.”20 Believing in “a 
patriotism of race as well as of country,” white Americans feared that people of color 
were uniting to contain and infiltrate what should be an expansive Anglo-Saxon 
civilization.21 “The dark races are gaining on us,” wrote Henry Adams in 1894. The 
threat was serious. “In another fifty years, at the same rate of movement, the white races 
will have to reconquer.” Americans spoke of the “yellow peril,” racial degradation, and 
the destruction of Western civilization.22  
 This atmosphere fostered a eugenics movement in the United States. A term 
coined from the Greek roots for “good” and “origins,” eugenics encompassed a belief that 
genetic inheritance or “breeding” determined intelligence, abilities, morals, and behavior. 
“I look upon race as far more important than nurture,” explained the father of the 
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eugenics movement, Great Britain’s Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin. Eugenics 
claimed that racially superior Caucasians had a moral obligation to improve society by 
raising up people of superior breeding or race while expanding civilization throughout the 
world. Expansionists conflated this civilizing mission with a determination to subvert 
indigenous peoples’ cultures while lusting for their economic resources.23 
  Nathaniel S. Shaler, an admirer of Galton and his work, was the dean of 
Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School and arguably the foremost promoter of the 
eugenics movement in the United States. Like his colleagues, Shaler professed that 
democracy could only exist where Anglo-Saxon superiority was acknowledged and 
perpetuated. Described by his biographer as “a figure of legendary stature,” for more than 
three decades Shaler taught eugenics as “science” to a large percentage of the Harvard 
student body. Harvard students of this era went on to assume positions of power that 
shaped federal policy far into the twentieth century. “It was they who made up a 
disproportionate segment of the leadership that guided America as it emerged as a world 
power,” wrote anthropologist C. Loring Brace. Among Shaler’s students were the young 
Theodore Roosevelt and his fifth cousin, Franklin D. Roosevelt. FDR took more classes 
from Shaler than from any other Harvard professor. Like his cousin, Franklin imbibed 
Social Darwinian ideas of the time, writing of the Anglo-Boer wars that “it will be best 
from the humanitarian standpoint for the British to win speedily and civilization will be 
hurried on.” 24 Later he wrote that Ethiopians were “probably in very much the stage of 
civilization as the small Kings and Barons were in Europe in the 12th Century.” 
Ethiopia’s emperor, he said, “is six centuries behind us.”25 
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As president in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt drastically reduced Japanese 
immigration through the Gentlemen’s Agreement, temporarily assuaging the “yellow 
peril” hysteria. Japan’s government cordially invited the Great White Fleet to visit Tokyo 
in October 1908, where hundreds of Japanese acknowledged the armada and the authority 
it represented, waving American flags and singing the “Star-Spangled Banner” in 
English.26 Though war fears in the Pacific abated, the clash of two opposing waves of 
expansionism had intensified racialized crosscurrents that remained just below the 
surface. 
Conflict in Europe diverted attention from the Pacific. On declaring war in 1914, 
Great Britain resurrected the internment policies proven effective in its defeat of the 
Boers. The British Empire’s Aliens Restriction Act and Defense of the Realm Act set the 
standard that other belligerent nations followed during World War I and expanded during 
World War II. The acts required aliens to register with the government and defined “alien 
enemies” as those born in nations with whom Britain was at war. Following these acts, 
authorities interned German and Austrian alien enemies throughout the empire. 
Internment camps spread rapidly around the world as belligerent governments followed 
Britain’s lead. By the end of World War I, Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, Canada, 
France, Austria, Germany, Russia, Romania, Italy, Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, and 
China had interned tens of thousands of “alien enemy” men, women, and children.27  
Belligerents had various reasons for interning alien enemies: to keep military-aged 
males from joining enemy forces, to protect against espionage and sabotage, and to take 
hostages in retaliation for the actions of an enemy nation. Warring governments 
threatened reprisals against civilians and made reciprocal exchanges of internees. Women 
   14 
 
 
and children were ostensibly interned for humanitarian purposes—to provide for them 
when their husbands and fathers were incarcerated—but they, too, came to be seen and 
used as hostages. Governments also utilized concentration camps and subsequent 
deportations to rid their nations of “undesirable” persons.28    
After its declaration of war in 1917, the United States followed suit. Woodrow 
Wilson signed two presidential proclamations practically identical to Great Britain’s alien 
acts, citing   Congress’s “Alien Enemy Act” as legal precedent. One of four “Alien and 
Sedition Acts” passed in 1798, the Alien Enemy Act authorized the president to prohibit 
from any area and to arrest and deport all “natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of a 
hostile nation” in time of war.29 Unlike the other three Alien and Sedition Acts, the Alien 
Enemy Act included no sunset provision.30 
Wilson’s proclamations forbid alien enemies from “any locality which the 
President” or the Attorney General “may from time to time designate by Executive Order 
as a prohibited area.” Alien enemies were required to register with the government and 
carry registration cards at all times. They could not possess wirelesses, weapons, or 
explosives. They must not be found within the District of Columbia, the Panama Canal 
Zone, within a half mile of a government naval yard or war-materials factory or within 
one hundred yards of the shoreline of the United States or its territories. The 
proclamations authorized United States marshals and local officers to arrest, intern, and 
deport summarily all alien enemies who violated or were believed “to be about to violate 
any of these regulations.” They could also arrest any alien enemy whose freedom might 
cause “danger to the public peace or safety.” The proclamations concluded, “all such 
agents, agencies, officers and departments are hereby granted full authority for all acts 
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done by them in the execution of this regulation.”31 Though the Alien Enemy Act and 
Wilson’s presidential proclamations only prescribed the evacuation, internment, and 
deportation of alien enemies, they laid the foundation for Executive Order 9066, which 
expanded the laws’ reach to encompass “any and all persons,” including American 
citizens.32  
The Labor and Justice Departments ran the internment program in the United 
States. Police arrested German and Austrian aliens from nearly every state, with most 
arrests in New York. Federal officials interned these aliens in camps at Ellis Island; 
Gloucester City, New Jersey; Hot Springs, North Carolina; Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia; and 
Fort Douglas, Utah. Under War Department pressure, authorities in Cuba, Haiti, Panama, 
American Samoa, Hawaii and the Philippines interned German and Austrian aliens and 
permitted their deportation to the United States. Like its European counterparts, the 
United States repatriated several thousand interned aliens and their dependents after the 
war, many against their will, including those shipped in from outside the country. It 
would have been impossible to intern millions of resident aliens and citizens of German 
and Austrian ancestry. Instead, local authorities arrested those alien enemies whom they 
arbitrarily judged to be in violation of Wilson’s presidential proclamations. Because they 
were not American citizens, these aliens had no public trial or habeas corpus rights.33 
Like other belligerent governments, the United States interned alien enemies in 
prisons and military forts or in race tracks, stables, and show grounds while larger 
detention centers were hastily constructed. These “camps” throughout the world, 
arbitrarily referred to as concentration camps, detention camps, or internment camps, 
were often wooden barracks heated by coal stoves, surrounded by barbed-wire fences, 
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and located in isolated areas. Sentries guarded the camps, shooting internees who drew 
too near the fences.34   
With few exceptions, Americans did not question the legality or the necessity of 
alien enemy internment. “While war was in progress,” Yale Law School professor and 
international law specialist Edwin Borchard explained in 1920, “there was every reason 
why we should exercise control and custody over those persons who might be deemed of 
potential danger to the United States, whether in fact they were so or not.”35 
In discussing internment policy, a watchword that officials repeatedly used was 
“loyalty.” A person’s professed or even demonstrated loyalty was irrelevant. During 
World War I, officials worldwide assumed that citizenship automatically determined 
loyalty.  “Any enemy subject in any country” at war “would, no doubt, deem it patriotic 
and as constituting loyalty to their respective countries to do what they could to injure the 
common enemy,” explained one American Consul-General in 1918. “If I were similarly 
situated I would assist my country wherever possible, and would naturally expect to be 
interned.”36 Many believed that place of birth trumped citizenship. Thus the Justice 
Department, under British and Canadian insistence, permitted the internment of 
naturalized United States citizens who had been born in Germany or Austria. “The 
present war has shaken to its foundations the whole fabric of naturalization,” protested 
the head of the State Department’s Citizenship Bureau.37  
Still others argued that the government should intern any American judged to be 
“disloyal,” regardless of citizenship status and native birth. In his 1917 book, The Foes of 
Our Own Household, former president Theodore Roosevelt advocated the internment of 
“disloyal” German Americans along with German aliens. “Every disloyal German-born 
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citizen should have his naturalization papers recalled and should be interned during the 
term of the war,” he said. “Every disloyal native-born American should be disfranchised 
and interned. It is time to strike our enemies at home” by “suppress[ing] the tens of 








Four years after World War I, in a continuing atmosphere of nativist suspicion of 
immigrants’ nationality and race, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1922 that 
Japanese immigrants could not become naturalized citizens. The withholding of 
citizenship from these individuals kept them on permanent probation as aliens and limited 
their rights. As long as immigrants remained aliens, the Bureau of Naturalization 
reasoned in 1922, they could be deported, “but once they succeed in obtaining their 
citizenship, this method of purging our country becomes more difficult.” Two years later, 
Congress passed the Oriental Exclusion Act, cutting off all Japanese immigration.39 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, now practicing law in New York, agreed with the 
legislation and rulings. In March 1923 he penned an article he titled “The Japs—A Habit 
of Mind.” Asia, a popular American magazine that reported on Asia and its people, 
published Roosevelt’s piece on July 23, under the edited title of “Shall We Trust Japan?”  
Though the Japanese and other Asians were a “race . . . of acknowledged dignity and 
integrity,” Roosevelt wrote,  
it must be admitted that, as a whole, [Americans] honestly believe—and in 
this belief they are at one with the people of Australasia and Canada—that 
the mingling of white with oriental blood on an extensive scale is harmful 
to our future citizenship. . . . Americans object to the holding of large 
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amounts of real property, of land, by aliens or those descended from mixed 
marriages. Frankly, they do not want non-assimilable immigrants as 
citizens.40 
 
Roosevelt reiterated this position in one of nine weekly columns written for 
Georgia’s Macon Telegraph. On April 30, 1925, one week after his column defending 
European immigrants, Roosevelt complained that “Japanese jingoes” were protesting 
Asian exclusion laws. He offered a racial justification for the exclusion. Californians had 
“properly objected” to the many thousands of Japanese settling in the United States and 
raising “children who become American citizens,” he wrote, “on the sound basic ground 
that Japanese immigrants are not capable of assimilation into the American populations.” 
Reflecting the views of Social Darwinists and eugenicists, Roosevelt claimed that 
“anyone who has traveled in the Far East knows that the mingling of Asiatic blood with 
European or American blood produces, in nine cases out of ten, the most unfortunate 
results.” He continued: “many cultivated, highly educated and delightful Japanese”  had 
told him that “they would feel the same repugnance and objection” to thousands of 
Americans settling in Japan and marrying Japanese as he himself felt “in having large 
numbers of Japanese come over here and intermarry with the American population. In 
this question then of Japanese exclusion from the United States, it is necessary only to 
advance the true reason—the undesirability of mixing the blood of the two peoples.” 
Legislation had stopped the flow of Japanese immigrants to the United States. But the 
previous immigrants’ American-born children, in the minds Roosevelt and others, 
presented a more perplexing problem because they already were United States citizens.41  
 In the 1930s, as worry grew about Japan’s growing militarism and expansionism 
along the Pacific Rim, U.S. leaders called for the internment of Japanese persons, both 
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citizen and alien, in Hawaii. In March 1933, the same month that Japan withdrew from 
the League of Nations after being censured for its expansionist policies, newspaper 
publisher Frank Knox sounded an alarm about Asian residents of the Hawaiian Islands. 
Knox had been one of Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders” in the Spanish-American 
War and, after pressing for American involvement in World War I, held the rank of 
Major as an artillery officer in France. After a trip to Hawaii, Knox wrote fellow World 
War I veteran and Deputy Chief of Staff Hugh Drum that he was “tremendously 
impressed and alarmed at the threat to our security” by “the swift growth and power of 
Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino citizens, who dictate to the political government and 
imperil the safety of our army garrison and our naval base in case of trouble with Japan. 
The first military precaution to be taken in Hawaii is to intern every Japanese resident 
before the beginning of hostilities threatens.”42 Knox’s words were reminiscent of Chief 
of Staff J.F. Bell’s 1908 letter.  
 Drum, who became commanding general of the Hawaii Department in 1935, 
agreed with Knox. For Knox, Drum, and other Americans fearful of an Asian enemy, 
loyalty now became a matter of race. “Orientals,” they believed, would not be loyal. 
After visiting each of the Hawaiian Islands and meeting with “leading American residents 
thereof,” Drum wrote on September 21, 1935, “I am convinced that few of the Orientals 
will be loyal in case of war. . . . It is the experience of all nations, including the United 
States, that mixtures of widely dissimilar racial elements constitute a serious problem in 
time of emergency. . . . The World War shows that during an emergency armed forces are 
often necessary to protect loyal citizens as against disaffected and rebellious ones.”43 
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 In October 1935, the Military Intelligence Division in Washington evaluated the 
danger. Using the code word of “Orange” for “Japan” or “Japanese,” a General Staff 
assessment claimed that “if Hawaii could be taken internally by Orange adherents in the 
territory[,] Orange could without great risk dispatch an expedition to make its capture 
secure.”44 On May 19, 1936, the Joint Board’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral W. H. 
Standley, wrote Secretary of War Harry Woodring, arguing that American defensive 
forces must guard against a surprise sea or air attack on the Hawaiian Islands. Such an 
attack, Standley warned, could be aided by “the great potential power of hostile 
sympathizers on those Islands” through “sabotage or armed insurrection.”45 
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt became concerned after reading a May 25, 1936, 
report of Hawaii’s Joint Planning Committee. The report noted that Japanese residents 
were entertaining sailors from Japanese naval vessels visiting Hawaiian ports. “One 
obvious thought occurs to me,” Roosevelt wrote Standley on August 10, 1936, “that 
every Japanese citizen or non-citizen . . . who meets these Japanese ships or has any 
connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his 
or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a 
concentration camp in the event of trouble.” Roosevelt advised that “a Joint Board should 
consider and adopt plans relating to the Japanese population of all the islands.” 
Roosevelt’s “obvious thought” was consistent with the internment and deportation policy 
of World War I, when the United States Navy helped carry out the policy and Roosevelt 
served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 46 Though now, fearing an Asian foe as well as 
European ones and believing in Social Darwinism’s “patriotism of race,” Roosevelt and 
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his contemporaries advocated the internment of Japanese American citizens along with 
alien enemies.47 
 Standley wrote to the Army Chief of Staff that the president had asked him and 
the Navy Secretary “what arrangements and plans have been made relative to 
concentration camps in the Hawaiian Islands for dangerous or undesirable aliens or 
citizens in the event of national emergency.”48 In late August, Secretary of War Harry 
Woodring reported to Roosevelt that the Joint Board was evaluating the president’s 
recommendations and that Hawaiian Department Commander Drum had established an 
Army “Service Command” to control “aliens and alien sympathizers.” In war time, 
Woodring said, military and civil forces would join to prevent civilian sabotage and 
uprisings, “aided in its control of potentially hostile Japanese by the local knowledge of 
its agents” and “the backing of Regular Army units.”49  
 Under Drum’s orders, World War I veteran and Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence George S. Patton Jr. drew up operational plans for the Command. Though the 
report was titled “A General Staff Study. Plan: Initial Seizure of Orange Nationals,” the 
plan applied to Japanese American citizens as well as Japanese aliens. Lieutenant Colonel 
Patton wrote that the primary objective was to maintain “internal security” through the 
internment of “certain persons of the Orange race” who were “most inimical to American 
interests” and “those whom, due to their position and influence in the Orange community, 
it is desirable to retain as hostages.” Following World War I strategies, the military could 
use these hostages to control the Japanese community in Hawaii and as a reprisal reserve 
in case of Japanese attack. The plan included a list of 128 Japanese “citizens and non-
citizens” in the Hawaiian Islands who would be interned first.50 When the Joint Board 
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concluded its evaluation in October 1936, Standley wrote Woodring that “it is a routine 
matter for those responsible for military intelligence to maintain lists of suspects, who 
will normally be the first to be interned . . . in the event of war.”51  
  By May 1937, Roosevelt was also worried about rumors of a sudden increase in the 
Japanese population on the west coast of Mexico. He called on his staff to evaluate the 
reports. In a May 21 memo, Woodring responded that there had been no “clandestine influx 
of large numbers of Japanese” to Lower (Baja) California and that Japanese fishing activity 
in the area was legitimate. “Considering the alertness of the United States Consuls on the 
West Coast of Mexico, the periodic visits of our naval vessels to the coast line of Lower 
California, . . . and the continued watchfulness of the War Department agencies” in 
Mexico, Woodring said, there was no cause for alarm.52 
 Clearly, a Japanese menace loomed large in Roosevelt’s mind. He rejected 
Woodring’s findings. “I do not think that this report is satisfactory,” Roosevelt replied to 
Woodring the next day. Roosevelt called Woodring’s assertion that naval ships would 
notice irregularities in the Japanese population of Baja “wholly absurd. The officers and 
men see nothing of what goes on one hundred feet back from the beach.” Roosevelt 
insisted that Army intelligence “procure a careful check” of the area. Within a few weeks 
Roosevelt also asked Woodring for a report on “Japanese activities” throughout Mexico, 
Central America, and Panama. That October, the Joint Board in Washington proposed the 
regulation of Japanese fishing boats along the California coast and Hawaii, as well as the 
replacement of Japanese workers on U.S. defense projects.53 
 Roosevelt’s May 16, 1940, address to Congress elucidated the president’s 
thinking. As war raged in Asia and Europe and conflict threatened in North Africa, 
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Roosevelt asked Congress to appropriate more than one billion dollars to prepare for war. 
Though the Atlantic and Pacific oceans previously provided a buffer around the Western 
Hemisphere, Roosevelt explained that recent developments in air navigation had brought 
“new possibilities of the use of nearer bases from which an attack or attacks on the 
American Continents could be made.” From West Africa, airplanes could fly to Brazil 
within seven hours. Brazil was but four flying hours from Venezuela. Venezuela was 
only two-and-a-half hours from Cuba and the Canal Zone, which were two and one-
quarter hours from Tampico, Mexico. Tampico was just over two hours from St. Louis, 
Kansas City, and Omaha. “On the other side of the continent,” Roosevelt continued, 
“Alaska, with a white population of only 30,000 people, is within four or five hours of 
flying distance to Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland. The Islands of the southern 
Pacific are not too far removed from the west coast of South America to prevent them 
from becoming bases of enormous strategic advantage to attacking forces.” Without 
providing specifics, Roosevelt also stated that “We have seen the treacherous use of the 
‘fifth column,’ by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually a part of 
an enemy unit.”54 
Roosevelt’s speech brought the far-off wars of Europe and Asia home to 
Americans. It also laid out his policy that protecting the nation meant guarding the entire 
Western Hemisphere, the same view that President Theodore Roosevelt and his 
colleagues had in 1907 as the Great White Fleet sailed toward the Pacific. Reflecting his 
Social Darwinian beliefs, FDR concluded that the United States must protect “the whole 
American hemisphere against invasion or control or domination by non-American 
nations.” 55 Later he privately expressed his concern that “the yellow race, which is far 
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more numerous than the white,” might “eventually use all the machines of western 
civilization to overrun & conquer the white race.”56  
 A few days after his address to Congress, Roosevelt received a letter from his 
friend and informal advisor, Henry L. Stimson. Like Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, 
Stimson received a degree from Harvard during the era when the tenets of Social 
Darwinism were so strongly professed. Stimson then served as Secretary of War from 
1911-13, as a Lieutenant Colonel during World War I, as Governor-General in the 
Philippines from 1927-29, as Secretary of State from 1929-33, and as Roosevelt and 
Hull’s informal advisor beginning in 1933. “I sincerely hope that those of our fellow 
countrymen who have been asleep thus far have at last awakened,” Stimson wrote FDR, 
expressing his “most hearty sympathy and approval” of Roosevelt’s speech to Congress. 
Dismissing the concerns of what he called “last ditch isolationists,” Stimson told the 
president that he was “gratified to see what appear to be the evidences of a truly united 
national feeling springing up over the country, and I feel confident that you will meet and 
cooperate with such a feeling.”57 
 The following day, Roosevelt confided to Stimson that he was “worried both by 
‘fifth column’ activities over here, and also by the large number of college student groups 
who are not only isolationists but completely pacifist.”58 Stimson concurred. “Experience 
in Europe had given warning of the danger of the fifth column,” he later said, “and had 
shown that residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy are a greater 
source of danger than those of different ancestry.”59  
Within a few weeks, Roosevelt asked for the resignation of his non-interventionist 
Secretary of War Harry Woodring. In June 1940 Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison 
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also resigned. The Democrat president then made an unusual move by replacing them 
with two Republicans, Stimson and Frank Knox, the newspaperman who in 1933 called 
for the internment of “every Japanese resident” of Hawaii as a “military precaution.”60  
Within weeks of these replacements, the War and Justice Departments stepped up 
surveillance of alien enemies from Japan, Germany, and Italy, while Congress passed the 
Alien Registration Act. Reminiscent of World War I, the act required alien residents of 
the United States and its territories to register, be fingerprinted, and file a statement of 
their personal and occupational status and political beliefs. From this registration, Army 
Intelligence and the Justice Department’s FBI compiled a list of German, Italian, and 
Japanese aliens considered dangerous or subversive to be arrested or interned on the 
outbreak of war.61 At this point, the focus was only on noncitizens of the United States. 
But the statements of Roosevelt, Stimson, and Knox reveal that those in the highest 
echelons of government were already open to the wartime internment of Japanese 
Americans. 
 In the summer of 1941, Japan detained one hundred American citizens in 
retaliation for the United States’s freezing of its assets. Such escalating conflicts between 
the two nations sparked fears of official retribution in the United States. “We talk of 
almost nothing but this great crisis,” one Japanese American told a Los Angeles Times 
reporter in early August. “Sometimes we only look for a concentration camp.”62 Exactly 
one month before Pearl Harbor, the November 7, 1941, “Munson report” informed 
Roosevelt and other federal officials that “Japanese on the West Coast” were already 
worried, “hop[ing] that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps.”63 
Others, perhaps recalling the World War I experience, championed retaliatory internment 
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of Japanese nationals even before a declaration of war. On August 18, Congressman John 
Dingell of Michigan wrote Roosevelt that, “if it is the intention of Japan to enter into a 
reprisal contest,” then the federal government should “cause the forceful detention or 
imprisonment in a concentration camp of ten thousand alien Japanese.” Dingell argued 
that the government should also “remind Japan that there are perhaps one hundred fifty 
thousand additional alien Japanese in the U.S. who will be held in a reprisal reserve 
whose status will depend upon Japan’s next aggressive move.”64  
 As the Justice Department and Army prepared lists of alien enemies to arrest in 
the United States and its territories on the outbreak of war, the State Department, through 
its foreign embassies, orchestrated internment plans in the wider Western Hemisphere. 
On October 20, 1941, U.S. ambassador to Panama Edwin Wilson reminded Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles of Panama’s internment of 
German aliens during World War I. Now, “in the event that we suddenly find ourselves at 
war with Japan . . . the attitude of the Panamanian Government is thoroughly cooperative. 
. . . Immediately following action by the United States to intern Japanese in the United 
States, Panama would arrest Japanese on Panamanian territory and intern them . . . all 
expenses and costs of internment and guarding to be paid by the United States.”65 
 Ambassador Wilson and other officials throughout World War II typically used 
the blanket term, “Japanese,” failing to distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry 
and Japanese aliens. Eight days after the ambassador wrote his letter, Army Chief of Staff 
George Marshall attempted to make that distinction, writing Welles that while it was 
“gratifying” to know of Panama’s willingness to cooperate with the United States, he 
suggested “that the agreement be enlarged to provide for internment of all persons 
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believed dangerous, who are regarded by the US as enemy aliens,” including Germans 
and Italians.66 
 By the day after Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Hull had initiated negotiations 
for the exchange of Japanese aliens in the United States for Americans in Japan, with 
Roosevelt helping him find vessels for the exchange. After Germany declared war on the 
United States, Hull also worked out an agreement for the exchange of Americans and 
Germans. The State Department chartered two Swedish cruise ships, the Gripsholm and 
Drottingholm, and used them throughout and after the war to exchange internees and 
deport “undesirable” civilians, including aliens and Japanese Americans. Some of these 
Japanese Americans were minors who were deported to Japan with their Japanese-
immigrant parents. Others were adults with dual citizenship who revoked their United 







AFTER PEARL HARBOR 
 
Within twenty-four hours of Pearl Harbor, following the patterns of World War I, 
Canada, Panama and other cooperating countries in the Western Hemisphere began 
arresting people of Japanese, German, and Italian ancestry while the Justice Department, 
working through the FBI and local police, rounded up some 1,200 enemy aliens in the 
United States and Hawaii using long-prepared lists. Many of those arrested in Latin 
America were eventually shipped to the United States for internment. Five days after 
Pearl Harbor, Hull instructed Ambassador Wilson to build a camp in Panama to serve as 
a holding area for the transshipment of arrestees to detention centers in the United States. 
In theory, the internment policy only applied to enemy aliens. In reality, Latin American 
citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian descent were interned along with aliens.68  
 On January 2, 1942, the Japanese army captured the Philippine capital of Manila. 
By January 5, the Japanese had rounded up some 3,500 British, Dutch, and American 
citizens in the Philippines and forced them into a makeshift internment center in two 
buildings at Manila’s Santo Tomas University. Subsisting on a meager diet of rice, garlic, 
and occasional fish and cornmeal, these internees slowly starved. Dysentery, measles, 
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smallpox, and jaundice ravaged the compound. The Japanese army also detained 
thousands of Allied citizens in various parts of Japan and occupied China.69 
 With War Department support, the State Department intensified its efforts to 
incarcerate Japanese, German, and Italian aliens from throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. At a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held in Rio 
de Janeiro on January 19, 1942, Undersecretary of State Welles warned of “subversive 
activities.” He outlined “numerous measures to be taken against potential fifth columnists 
and the control of all foreigners.” He recommended the creation of an inter-American 
“Emergency Committee for Political Defense” to coordinate these measures. The 
committee immediately formed and adopted a State Department-drafted resolution 
stressing the necessity of immediate, preventive detention of “dangerous aliens” from all 
Axis nations and the “deportation of such persons to another American republic for 
detention when adequate local detention facilities are lacking.” The United States offered 
to be that American republic, providing not only detention centers but also shipping 
transports for the deportees “at its own expense.” Many aliens had spouses and children 
born in Latin America. These could choose to be deported and interned as dependents to 
keep their families together. A second part of the resolution revealed an additional motive: 
the State Department offered to include any detained “nationals of the participating 
republics in whatever exchange arrangements the U.S. would subsequently make with 
Axis powers.”70 Immediately after the formation of the Emergency Committee for 
Political Defense, a member of the U.S. embassy in Mexico criticized Mexico for its 
“apathy” and wrote Secretary of State Hull that he “hoped that pressure from this 
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Committee may increase the effectiveness of Mexican cooperation in the relatively near 
future.”71 
  The inter-American agency was effective in Mexico and Central America, “but it 
required the dispatch to the four northwestern countries of South America [Columbia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru] a special representative of the Department and constant 
contact and supervision of the expulsion movement in order to have it succeed,” wrote 
Secretary of State Hull. When the arrests were made, simply being an alien was the 
criterion that made a suspect “dangerous.” By August 1942, the governments of Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominic 
Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia had incarcerated and 
shipped to the United States for internment more than 3,000 civilians—Japanese, 
German, and Italian nationals along with those born in Latin America. Chile and 
Paraguay later joined that list, and by 1945 the United States interned thousands more 
deportees from Latin America. Brazil instituted its own detention program, interning at 
least 8,300 Japanese Brazilians and aliens.72    
 The State Department also secretly used propaganda to win and maintain support 
for its internment policies. The U.S. ambassador to Chile submitted a twenty-page 
memorandum to the Chilean government suggesting that an alien spy network existed in 
that country. This network was not only a violation of Chilean sovereignty, declared the 
memo, but also a menace to the Western Hemisphere.73 
 In Peru, which had a population of some 30,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, the 
U.S. embassy recommended the removal of key Japanese leaders and the encouragement 
of “propaganda intended to call attention of the Peruvians to the Japanese dangers. . . . 
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Ways may be found to provide . . . material without of course permitting the source to 
become known as the Embassy.”74  
 These tactics were effective. Three months later, the American embassy in Peru 
could report to the State Department that Peruvian President Manuel Prado was “very 
much interested [in] getting rid of the Japanese in Peru. . . . He is thinking in terms of 
repatriating thousands of Japanese. . . . The President’s goal apparently is the substantial 
elimination of the Japanese colony in Peru,” which included Japanese Peruvian citizens.75 
One of these deportees later reported, “We were taken to the port of Callao [in Peru] and 
embarked on an American transport under strict guard and with machine gun[s] pointed 
at us by American soldiers.”76   
U.S. Army transports brought prisoners from Latin America to ports in New 
Orleans, San Francisco, and San Pedro, California. Because soldiers on the transports 
seized passports and other personal documentation of the deportees before their arrival at 
American ports, officials of the Immigration and Naturalization service had the deportees 
arrested on the grounds that they were illegal immigrants. The Justice Department then 
interned them in camps in California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New 
Mexico, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. These camps were distinct from the ten “War 
Relocation Authority” (WRA) camps that housed Japanese Americans and Japanese 
resident aliens of the United States.77 
While the State Department garnered support for the internment policy throughout 
Latin America, the War Department worked to win support for it at home. Following 
precedent, the Justice Department was responsible for civilian affairs and the internment 
of alien enemies. War Department leaders in Washington could not carry out plans to 
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intern Japanese American citizens as well as aliens until it had the approval of the Justice 
Department. This created conflict between the two departments. During the last week of 
December 1941, U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle sent Assistant Attorney General 
James Rowe to the San Francisco headquarters of Western Defense Commander John De 
Witt. Rowe’s mission was to ensure General De Witt’s support for keeping alien 
internment efforts under the civilian control of the Justice Department. At that time, De 
Witt said that although he supported the internment of “enemy aliens,” he did not see the 
internment of Japanese Americans as necessary. “I don’t think it’s a sensible thing to do,” 
said De Witt. “An American Citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all 
may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if 
necessary.”78 When Washington-based Provost Marshal General A.W. Gullion 
telephoned De Witt on December 26, De Witt also stated that “it would be better if [the 
internment of enemy aliens] worked through the civil channels.” Irritated, Gullion said 
that “the Attorney General is not functioning” and threatened to have Stimson complain 
to President Roosevelt.79 Gullion apparently followed through on his threat. Several 
weeks later, Stimson reported to the president that he had been “pressing hard on the 
Panama defenses, and spending a good deal of time on De Witt and the West Coast.”80 
 Immediately after his phone conversation with De Witt, Gullion sent the head of 
the aliens division for the provost marshal general’s office, Major Karl R. Bendetson, to 
De Witt’s Presidio headquarters, even while Rowe was still present. Bendetson was a 
Stanford Law School graduate in his early thirties who went on active duty as a captain in 
1940. Within a few months after his arrival at the Presidio he changed the spelling of his 
last name and received a double promotion to colonel. Bendetson became the Army’s 
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instrument in shifting authority for the internment of noncombatants in the United States 
from the civilian control of the Justice Department to the military control of the War 
Department. Under Bendetson’s pressure, De Witt’s opinion on Japanese American 
incarceration also quickly changed. In a January 1 phone conversation, De Witt told 
Gullion’s deputy, Colonel Archer Lerch, “I don’t want to go after this thing piece meal. I 
want to do it on a mass basis.”81 To please his superiors, De Witt changed his argument 
from “an American Citizen . . . is an American citizen” to “a Jap is a Jap,” trumping 
citizenship with race.82 
West Coast agitation for mass evacuation also shifted shortly after Bendetson’s 
arrival. In an effort to shape public opinion and win widespread support of mass 
evacuation, Bendetson quickly set up a publicity office at the Presidio. He gave public 
speeches and, using journalistic experience he had gained while working for his 
hometown and Stanford newspapers, issued official press releases and gave interviews 
advocating the military necessity of interning not only enemy aliens, but also Japanese 
Americans. Bendetson’s office closely monitored the reactions of the press and the 
public, keeping clippings of hundreds of news articles on the subject until the spring of 
1942.83 Through Bendetson, the War Department fanned the flames of racism to win 
public, political, and ultimately Justice Department support for its plans to intern 
American citizens of Japanese descent. In other words, public sentiment did not lead 
Washington to initiate internment plans. Rather, Washington mobilized the grassroots.    
 A February 4, 1942, memorandum provides an example of the racialized 
propaganda Bendetson released. Interning only alien Japanese “would accomplish little 
as a measure of safety,” he wrote, because Japanese Americans’ “affections, if any, for 
   35 
 
 
the U.S. will not be stimulated by the wholesale removal of their parents.” The vast 
majority of those who have studied “the Oriental” believed that a majority of Japanese 
Americans are loyal to Japan and “at the proper time will engage in organized sabotage, 
particularly should a raid along the P[acific] C[oast] be attempted by the Japanese,” he 
claimed. “As you cannot penetrate the Oriental thinking and as you cannot tell which 
ones are loyal and which ones are not, . . . it is the easiest course to remove them all from 
the West Coast.”84 On the day he issued this memo, Bendetson changed the spelling of 
his name to “Bendetsen.” His colleagues adopted the change. Though his grandparents 
were Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, Bendetsen claimed Danish ancestry.85 
 Playing on fears of the “yellow peril,” Bendetsen’s efforts were effective. 
“Colonel Bendetson . . . has developed a publicity organization that [Assistant Secretary 
of War] John J. McCloy thinks is doing a good job,” a State Department employee wrote 
in an interdepartmental memo. McCloy “receives each day large quantities of clippings 
from West Coast papers giving publicity to statements that are issued by Colonel 
Bendetsen’s office.”86 The ground had been well prepared. 
Just in time for publication in Sunday morning newspapers on January 25, 1942, 
the government released the findings of the Roberts Commission on Pearl Harbor. 
Roosevelt appointed the commission, chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, 
to ascertain the facts relating to the Pearl Harbor attack. The report mentioned rumored 
espionage activities of Japanese consular agents, which the media reported as “the fifth 
column at work.” Though Honolulu Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, congressional 
delegate Samuel King of Hawaii, and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover refuted the stories of 
sabotage and espionage by Japanese aliens and citizens, the report had a significant effect 
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on the West Coast press, politicians, and public. During the week of January 26 through 
February 1—beginning the day after the publication of the Roberts Report—the number 
of editorials, letters, and telegrams demanding expulsion of Japanese Americans along 
with aliens jumped. That number dramatically increased each week until Roosevelt 
signed Executive Order 9066.87  
 On January 29, four days after the Roberts Report’s publication and two days 
after meeting with California Governor Culbert Olson, De Witt reported to Bendetsen 
that “there’s a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese 
of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land. . . . Since the 
publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of 
enemies. They don’t trust the Japanese, none of them.”88 Though War Department 
officials had urged De Witt to advocate Japanese American internment rather than the 
other way around, Bendetsen asked De Witt if he would be willing to accept 
responsibility for such a program. “As I understand it,” Bendetsen said in summarizing 
De Witt’s phone conversation, “you are of the opinion that there will have to be an 
evacuation on the west coast, not only of Japanese aliens but also of Japanese citizens, 
that is, you would include citizens along with alien enemies, and . . . if you were 
requested you would be willing on the coast to accept responsibility.” 
 “Yes I would,” De Witt answered. “And I think it’s got to come sooner or later.” 
 “Yes sir, I do too,” Bendetsen replied, “and I think the subject may be discussed 
tomorrow at the congressional delegation meeting.”89 
 Bendetsen referred to an informal meeting of the Pacific Coast House delegation, 
an ad hoc caucus of western representatives. Though he said that “he was present as an 
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observer,” in his telephone conversations with De Witt before and after the meeting he 
made it clear that he had promoted the internment of all West Coast Japanese. Bendetsen 
told the delegation that “the War Department would be entirely willing” to accept 
responsibility for a mass internment “provided they accorded the War Department, and 
the Secretary of War, and the military commander under him, full authority to require the 
services” of any federal civil agency (meaning the Justice Department), and that the civil 
agency would be “required to respond.” 90 
 “That’s good,” De Witt replied. “Mr. Hoover himself as head of the FBI would 
have to function under the War Department exactly as he is functioning under the 
Department of Justice.”91 Hoover had refused to respond to military alarms regarding 
fifth-column activity among Japanese Americans. In 1940, complaining that he did not 
trust the competence of the Military Intelligence Division, he had directed FBI agents to 
investigate Japanese aliens. In November that year, these agents reported that only 
Japanese-alien “leaders; that is, the Buddhist and Shintoist priests, the Japanese language-
school teachers, the consular agents and a small percentage of prominent alien Japanese 
businessmen,” would be a threat in case of war with Japan. “Upon the interning of the 
Japanese leaders in the community, there need be no fear” of other Japanese aliens or 
Japanese American populations, the report stated.92  Clearly, Hoover did not join the rush 
to judgment that pressed Roosevelt and military officials toward mass evacuation. 
 Bendetsen encouraged De Witt to continue to push for military authority over the 
“Japanese problem” as if it had been De Witt’s idea in the first place, telling him that 
“opinion is beginning to become irresistible, and I think that anything you recommend 
will be strongly backed up . . . by the public.”93 
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 The Pacific Coast congressional delegation immediately prepared its 
recommendations. On the day of their meeting with Bendetsen, in a letter to Secretary of 
War Stimson, the delegation requested mass evacuation of “all enemy aliens and their 
families,” which encompassed Japanese Americans.94 California Attorney General Earl 
Warren entered the fray on the same day, when an Associated Press news release quoted 
him saying that “the Japanese situation as it exists in this state today may well be the 
Achilles’ heel of the entire civilian defense effort.”95 
 Two days later, on February 1, Bendetsen, Gullion, and Assistant Secretary of 
War John J. McCloy visited Attorney General Biddle and Assistant Attorney General 
Rowe in Biddle’s office in Washington D.C. Though Biddle supported the wartime 
internment of “alien enemy” Japanese, he protested the growing public and political 
pressure for the internment of Japanese Americans. He argued that neither he nor the FBI 
had found any evidence of Japanese American sabotage. Biddle presented the Army men 
with a proposed joint press release, which read in part: “The Department of War and the 
Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this 
time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race. The Secretary of 
War, General De Witt, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation believe that the appropriate steps have been and are being taken.”96  
 The meeting became tense when the Army officials refused to approve the press 
release. Rowe brought up his earlier visit to De Witt’s headquarters, when the Western 
Defense Commander had told him he did not think mass evacuation was necessary. Rowe 
wondered aloud what had changed De Witt’s mind, then made uncomplimentary remarks 
about Bendetsen. He then said there was “no evidence whatsoever of any reason for 
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disturbing citizens.” When Biddle insisted that the Justice Department would have 
nothing to do with the unconstitutional disturbance of innocent citizens, Gullion 
reportedly became “sore” and said, “Well, listen, Mr. Biddle, do you mean to tell me if 
the Army, the men on the ground, determine it is a military necessity to move citizens, 
Jap citizens, that you won’t help us?” After Biddle restated his position, McCloy 
answered, “If it is a question of safety of the country, [or] the Constitution of the United 
States, why the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me.”97  
 Such pressure on the Justice Department head was unrelenting, even from within 
his department. The following day, February 2, California Attorney General Earl Warren 
called a conference of California law enforcement officials, where he secured passage of 
a resolution that “[a]ll alien Japanese be forthwith evacuated from all areas in the state of 
California to some place in the interior.”98 But by February 7, Warren changed his 
statement as De Witt had done, saying the military should remove “any or all Japanese” 
from military zones. On February 21, Warren echoed the racial argument set forth in 
Bendetsen’s February 4 memo when he testified before a U.S. House of Representatives 
committee. “When we are dealing with the Caucasian race, we have methods that will 
test the loyalty of them,” Warren said, but “when we deal with the Japanese, we are in an 
entirely different field and we cannot form any opinion.”99 This testimony came just a 
day before Stimson told Roosevelt that he had been “pressing hard” on the West Coast. 
Even Justice Department officials were coming on board with the War Department’s 
goals.  
 On February 5, Stimson had written Hull that General Douglas MacArthur 
reported that the Japanese army’s harsh treatment of Americans and British in occupied 
   40 
 
 
Philippines, in sharp contrast to its moderate treatment of Filipinos, was “unquestionably 
designed to discredit the white race.” Stimson suggested that Hull “present a threat of 
reprisals against the many Japanese nationals now enjoying negligible restrictions in the 
United States, to insure proper treatment of our nationals in the Philippines.” On the same 
day, Stimson drew up formal plans that would authorize the internment of Japanese 
Americans as well as Japanese nationals. Six days later, after presenting these plans to 
Roosevelt, Stimson wrote in his diary that he “fortunately found that he [the president] 
was very vigorous about it.” After that meeting, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy told 
Bendetsen, “We have carte blanche to do what we want to as far as the President is 
concerned.”100 
 The following day, Biddle capitulated to the pressure. He wrote Stimson on 
February 12 that he had “no doubt that the Army can legally, at any time, evacuate all 
persons in a specified territory if such action is deemed essential.” Though “American 
citizens of Japanese origin could not, in my opinion, be singled out of an area and 
evacuated with the other [alien] Japanese, . . .  the result might be accomplished by 
evacuating all persons in the area and then licensing [allowing] back those whom the 
military authorities thought were not objectionable.”101 
On February 19, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, transferring authority to 
designate restricted areas from the Attorney General to the Secretary of War. The carefully 
worded order also authorized the Secretary of War and his designees to exclude from these 
areas and intern “any or all persons.” Though Japanese Americans were not specifically 
mentioned, the War Department applied this broad categorization to them. Finally, the 
order stipulated that the Attorney General and the Justice Department continue to prescribe 
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“regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies,” except as superseded by the 
military. Hence, Secretary of War Henry Stimson authorized his designee Colonel Karl 
Bendetsen to oversee the forced evacuation of Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens and 
their placement in WRA camps, while the Attorney General oversaw, in separate “Justice 
Department camps,” the internment of Japanese aliens from Latin America and German 
and Italian aliens from the United States and Latin America.102  
 The day after Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, a conciliatory Biddle wrote 
the president that the Justice Department “gives very broad powers to the Secretary of 
War and the Military Commanders. . . . The decision of safety of the nation in time of 
war is necessarily for the Military authorities. Authority over the movement of persons, 
whether citizens or non-citizens, may be exercised in time of war.”103  
The military had led West Coast representatives to believe that they were 
primarily responsible for making the internment happen. “The Army was only slightly 
more willing than the Justice Department to evacuate the Japs,” said Congressman Ed V. 
Izac of California. “Evacuation would never have taken place if the united Pacific Coast 
delegations had not applied pressure—not only upon the Attorney-General and the 
Secretary of War—but also on the President himself.” Congressman John Coffee of 
Washington stated. “The War Department was not at all anxious to take over evacuation. 
It would not have taken action without the strong remonstrance of the congressional 
delegation. The War Department needed prodding, and the ‘flag-wavers’ supplied it.”104 
 Until late 1942, Stimson, Knox, and Roosevelt advocated interning the entire 
Japanese population of Hawaii, including aliens and citizens, either in mainland camps or 
on the island of Molokai. Though Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, head of Army intelligence 
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in Hawaii, conceded that it had “long been realized that from a security standpoint it 
would be desirable to remove all persons of Japanese extraction from the Territory of 
Hawaii,” he reported in December 1942 that such a measure would be impractical. The 
United States did not have sufficient ships to transport the potential internee population 
of 160,000. Even if it did, such a mass internment would disrupt the territory’s economy 
to the detriment of the American war effort. Fielder’s report demonstrated that workers of 
Japanese ancestry comprised 45 percent of the territory’s manufacturing industry, 30 
percent of its transportation industry, and 24 percent of its agricultural labor. As an 
alternative to mass internment, he recommended keeping the Japanese community under 
military control through continuing its policy of “periodic searches” and “detention” of 
the community’s prominent aliens. Fielder’s recommendations prevailed. The military 
interned fewer than 2,000 Japanese aliens in Hawaii—Buddhist and Shinto priests, 
publishers, editors, reporters, language-school teachers, businessmen, and doctors.105  
In August 1942, Secretary of State Hull wrote to Roosevelt of the State 
Department’s ongoing Latin American policy of arrest, internment, and repatriation. Two 
shiploads of German aliens and their family members had been exchanged for citizens of 
Western Hemispheric countries. These German exchangees were “aliens whom the Latin 
American Governments desired to be rid of,” said Hull, deported from the American 
Republics of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia 
on the condition that they would be traded for their detained citizens.  
Secretary of State Hull’s letter was reminiscent of Bell’s 1908 position. Like Bell, 
Hull was “very much concerned” about the potential for sabotage from German aliens 
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still at large “in those countries to the south of us, roaming more or less at liberty 
throughout areas where they can do serious damage and send information detrimental to 
our cause.” Loyal to their country of birth, they might destroy power plants, 
communication facilities, mines producing “essential materials,” storage houses, and 
harbor facilities that American ships used. These aliens must be deported to their “home” 
country, Hull wrote, or interned. Hull also focused on the “Japanese situation.” Some 
3,300 American citizens were now detained in Japan-occupied China. “Many of them are 
substantial persons who have represented important American business and commercial 
interests.” Some were in concentration camps and some had limited liberty, but all were 
subject to “cruel and harsh treatment by their oppressors. Under our agreement with 
Japan, which is still operating, we will be able to remove these people [through] two 
more trips of the Gripsholm. . . . In exchange for them we will have to send out Japanese 
in the same quantity.” Separating loyalty from citizenship, Hull recommended that the 
United States continue “efforts to remove all the Japanese from these American Republic 
countries for internment in the United States.” Joining loyalty to citizenship, he suggested 
that “[we] continue our efforts to remove from South and Central America all the 
dangerous Germans and Italians still there, together with their families.”106  
That month, some 1,500 persons of Japanese ancestry—many of them Japanese 
nationals traveling with family members who were citizens of the United States or Latin 
America—were shipped to Asia from the U.S. in a second exchange of prisoners with 
Japan. A Life magazine reporter, Shirley Mydans, was one of the thousands of Americans 
interned in Asia who was exchanged. She described watching Japanese repatriates and 
expatriates disembark from the Gripsholm as Allied citizens prepared to board. “The 
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Japanese repatriates filed in a line far outside of us,” Mydans wrote. “Compared to us 
they seemed healthy and well-dressed—all in American clothes.” Mydans apparently did 
not realize that the exchangees wore American clothes because many were Americans—
North and South Americans with names like Agnes, Michael, and Paul, or Ricardo, 
Eduardo, and Ana Maria.  
 As the Allied exchangees boarded the New York-bound Gripsholm, the American 
Red Cross handed out American chocolate bars and cigarettes. The freed prisoners 
joyfully sailed for home, appeasing their two-year hunger with buffets of American food, 
reading American magazines, and sipping iced tea as they lounged in the sun. Who could 
blame them? For twenty-two months they had starved in concentration camps. The men 
had “all taken their belts in so much that their pants looped around their waists,” Mydans 
said. “We women looked the same.” When the Gripshom steamed into New York harbor 









 Historians and political scientists have long argued that the Roosevelt 
Administration’s decision to intern Japanese Americans came under pressure from West 
Coast grassroots agitation. Following Pearl Harbor, simmering anti-Japanese sentiment 
found opportunity to vent in editorials and letters and petitions to California, Washington, 
and Oregon congressional delegations. They, in turn, pressured the White House to act. Yet, 
in interning Japanese Americans and aliens during World War II, the federal government 
did not capitulate to West Coast political pressures in a moment of hysteria. Rather, from 
the top down, federal officials fanned pre-existing racism to win broad support for its 
previously planned actions.  
 The policy was long in the making. For decades, federal officials had developed 
their options for “enemies at home” in the event of war. At the turn of the century, Great 
Britain and the United States created concentration camps to suppress rebellion in South 
Africa and in the Philippines, respectively. By 1908, U.S. officials discussed the “restraint” 
and deportation of “Japanese residents” in the event of war with Japan. During World War I, 
belligerent nations, including the United States, interned tens of thousands of civilians of 
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“enemy” nationality, exchanging and deporting many of them during and after the war. 
These practices would continue through World War II. Shaped by the ideology of Social 
Darwinism, Western governments sought to create ideal societies, using war to purge what 
they deemed “unfit” or “undesirable” elements. 
 In the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt encouraged the military to develop 
internment plans for both Japanese “citizens and non-citizens” in the event of hostilities 
with Japan. After Pearl Harbor, War Department officials fanned the flames of anti-Japanese 
racism in the United States to force Justice Department capitulation to their plans to 
internment Japanese Americans as well as alien enemies. Meanwhile, the State Department 
pressured Latin American government to arrest and deport Axis nationals to the United 
States for internment. By February 1942, Executive Order 9066 was not extraordinary to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913-1920, or to 
the World War I veterans of his Cabinet. Informed by Social Darwinism, recalling their 
experiences in World War I, and building on their fantasies of Japanese invasion during the 
interwar years, they plotted a course expansive in numbers and space. Casting a wide net, 
federal officials beat the drum of internment on the West Coast and Latin America. Backed 
up against the demands of national security, Justice Department officials capitulated, 
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